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[L.A. No. 28919.

In Bank.

Oct. 30, 1967.]

JOAN MURIEL WEINBERG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
FRANCIS STEPHEN WEINBERG, Defendant and
Appellant.
[1] Husband and Wife-Liability-Debts of Husband.-The policy of protecting the husband's creditors outweighs the policy
of protecting family income cven from premarital creditors of
the husband; community property is available to such creditors; and as such a creditor, a husband's first wife can levy
against the community property of his second marriage for
alimony payments due.

[1] See CaJ.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 90; Am.Jur.2d. Community Property, § 85.
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 124; [2] Husband and Wife, § 100; [3] Husband and Wife, § 119; [4, 5, 16]
Husband and Wife, § 130; [6, 11] Divorce and Separation, § 230;
[7, 8, 12, 14, 15] Divorce and Separation, § 221; [9] Divorce and
Separation, § 233; [10] Divorce and Separation, § 235; [13]
Divorce and Separation, § 237(3); [17] Divorce and Separation,
§ 184(3) (b).
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[2] Id.-Property-Management and Control of Community Property.-As manager of the community property with like absolute power of disposition, other than testamentary, as he has
of his separate estate (Civ. Code, § 172), the husband may
voluntarily discharge his obligation for alimony payments due
to his first wife from 'the community property of his second
marriage.
[3] Id. - Liability - Community Property. - With certain
exceptions, the California community property system is based
on the principle that all debts which are not specifically made
the obligations of the wife are grouped together as the obligations of the husband and the community property.
[4] Id. - Liability - Oommunity Property - Reimbursement for
Advances.-The community of a husband and his second wife
ean claim reimbursement from the husband's separate estate
when community property has been used to discharge a huslland's. obligation for alimony payments due his first wife
where such obligations were incurred before his second marriage and represented a continuing obligation based on both
his community and separate incomes, where during his second
. marriage the parties' net worth substantially increased but
• only 17 percent of which was community property, it being
! unjust under such circumstances to the second wife to allow
i her husband to preserve his separate estate by using only
,community funds to meet alimony payments SUbstantially
based on his large separate income.
[6] Id. - Liability - Community Property - Reimbursement for
Advances.-An apportionment of the husband's alimony and
child support obligations to his first wife between his separate
income and the income of community property of a second
marriage should be made and the husband's total separate and
community income during the period of his second marriage
should be used to determine the proportionate amounts that
his separate and community property will be charged where,
although his earnings from separate property were sufficient
to pay the whole, it would be inequitable to charge the obligations wholly to his separate property, since the obligations
were continuing and based in part on his community earnings;
and in determining the proportion, his separate income must
include capital increases in investments, even though gains are
not realized.
[6] Divorce and Separation-Disposition of Oommunity Property.
-In determining the property rights of the parties in a
divorce action, no adjustment for the benefit either party
received from deductions for alimony paid to the husband's
first wife and taken on joint income tax returns of the husband and his second wife had to be made where no specific
computation of the actual benefit to the second wife or detri-
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ment to the husband appeared, but the record showed that
both parties shared the benefit of the deductions for such
alimony taken on joint tax returns.
[7] ld.-Disposition of Property-Determination of Character of
Property.-In determining the property rights of the parties
in a divorce action, the trial court did not err in finding that a
portion of the increase in value of stock in small closely held
corporations owned by the husband at the time of marriage
was attributable to a growth of 7 percent per annum as a fair
return on his investment, and that the balance of the increase
in value was attributable to the husband's labor and skill and
therefore community property, the trial court correctly adopting the rate of legal interest in the absence of evidence of
current returns, and disregarding the effect of inflation and
other economic factors where the husband offered no evidence
thereon.
[8] ld.-Disposition of Property-Determination of Cha.racter of
Property.-In determining the property rights of the parties
in a divorce action, the trial court did not err in finding profits
and accruals in excess of the husband's separate property
investment and interest thereon to be community property
attributable to defendant's efforts although he had only withdrawn part of that excess in the form of salary payments, and
in not making an adjustment for tax obligations that might
have been but were not incurred by the husband had additional salary been withdrawn by him from the business.
[9] ld.-Disposition of Community Property-Division Equally
Between the Parties.-In determining the property rights of
the parties in a divorce action, the community property must
be divided equally between the husband and wife where both
parties were awarded a divorce.
[10] ld. - Disposition of Community Property - Decree. - In
determining the property rights of the parties in a divorce
action, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
.,a money judgment for the value of the wife's interest in the
·capital stock of certain closely held corporations' instead of
ordering a stock distribution to her, where, although there
would be tax consequences if defendant satisfied the judgment
by withdrawing funds from the corporations or selling some of
his stock, there was no indication that he needed or intended
to do either to satisfy the judgment, the trial court not being
required to speculate as to tax consequences that might or
might not arise after the division of the community property.
[11] ld. - Disposition of Community Property. - In determining
the property rights of the parties in a divorce action, the trial
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d Rev., Divorce, Separation and Annulment,
§ 170 et seq. i Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 925 et seq.

560

,
.

;

,
~

WEINBERG V. WEINBERG

[67 C.2d

court did not err in failing to consider possible tax consequences involved where there was no showing of immediate
and specific tax liability tv either party.
[12] Id.-Disposition of Property-Determination of Character of
Property.-In determining the property rights of the parties
in a divorce action, the evidence supported the trial court's
finding that defendant's efforts were minimal within the meaning of the rule that an apportionment of profits is required
not only when the husband conducts a commercial enterprise
but also when he invests separate funds in securities, and that
the proceeds and increment in value are apportioned entirely
to the husband's separate estate only when they are attributable solely to the natural enhancement of the property or
when the husband expended only minimal effort, where the
record showed that from the time of his marriage until he
severed connection with certain corporations except as a
shareholder, defendant spent virtually all of his time and
efforts -in the management of other business affairs and that,
while defendant owned 50 percent of the stock in the corporations, the other major stockholder directed the business affairs
of such corporations, the husband devoting little time to their
affairs or management, and generally participating only to a
limited extent in policy decisions.
[IS] Id.-Disposition of Community Property-Review-Evidence
to Support Judgment.-In determining the property rights of
the parties in a divorce action, the trial court did not err in
not allocating any of the increase in value in the husband's
investment in a group of corporations to the community where
although his efforts were minimal in connection with corporate affairs, the wife was entitled to introduce other evidence
that they were of measurable value but did not do so.'
[14] Id.-Disposition of Property-Determination of Character of
Property.-In determining the property rights of the parties
in a divorce action, the trial court was justified in finding that
the husband segregated his community income in one bank
account and kept it apart from his separate income which he
deposited in a different bank and that any increase in the
latter account, although not entirely accounted for, was from
separate property where defendant's only community income,
apart from interests in various trust funds and increases in
the value of his businesses, was salary income, and there was
no evidence of community funds received by him from any
other source, and where defendant testified that he deposited
all his salary checks in the community income account and
there was no evidence that community funds were deposited
elsewhere nor that disbursements for community purposes
were made out of his separate ~ccount rather than the community account.
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[15] ld.-Disposition of Property-Determination of Oharacter of
,Property.-In determining the property rights of the parties
in a divorce action, the trial court c-rrcd in finding that a fund
received by the wife in settlement of a cause of action for
personal injuries remained her separate property where the
wife indorsed and delivered to her husband the check received
in settlement and the husband deposited in a community
account, thereafter transferring the money to a joint checking
account used by both parties to pay community expenses, it
being presumed under such circumstances that the wife made
a gift to the community.
[16] Husband and Wife-Liability-Oommunity Property-Reimbursements for Advances.-A party to a marriage who uses
separate property for community purposes is entitled to reimbursement from the community or separate property of the
other party only if there is an agreement between them to
that effect.
[17] Divorce and Separation-Oounsel Fees--Discretion of Oourt .
.-In awarding counsel fees to a wife in a' divorce action, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife
legal fees out of the separate property of the husband for
under Civ. Code, § 137.3, giving thE' court discretion to order
payment of such amount as may be reasonably necessary for
attorney fees without regard to available sources, the trial
court need not require a wife to resort to her own capital for
payment of her counsel before ordering her husband to pay
attorney fees even when the wife has separate property in
addition to community property.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Kurtz Kauffman, Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
Action for divorce. Portion of judgment adjudicating the
property rights of the parties and awarding alimony reversed
with directions; in other respects judgment affirmed.
Ward & Heyler and Charles A. Druten for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Edward Sumner for Defendant and Appellant.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Both parties appeal from an interlocutory judgment granting a divorce to each, awarding alimony
[17] See Cal.Jur.2d Rev., Divorce, Separation and Annulment,
§ 82, et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Spearation, § 571 et seq.
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tn plaintiff wife, determining the property rights of the
parties, and awarding fees and costs. Neither party challenges
the part of the judgment granting the divorce, but each
contends that in other respects the trial court committed various errors.
Plaintiff and defendant married on June 2, 1959, and separated on October 30, 1963. They have no children. Plaintiff
had virtually no property at the time of the marriage.
Defendant's net worth was $489:208.19, including all of the
shares of All Metal Fabricators, Inc. and Alpha Engineering
Corporation, 50 percent of the shares of Airborne Electronics
Corporation, interests in employee profit sharing and retirement plan trust funds of two of the corporations, and several"
checking accounts. The trial court found that the net worth of
both parties increased during the marriage to not less than
$2.487,928.08, of which $338,164.93 was community property.
Defendant has two cllildren by a previous marriage, which
also ended in divorce. The decree in that case awarded custody of the children to defendant's former wife, incorporated
a property settlement agreement, and ordered defendant to
pay $1,800 per month alimony and $600 per month child support. During his second marriage defendant used community
funds to pay the alimony and child support. The trial court
held that defendant must reimburse the community for the
alimony payments but that the child support was an obligation he could charge against the community estate. Plaintiff
contends that neither the alimony nor the child support payments benefited the community and that therefore both should
have been charged against defendant's separate property.
Defendant contends that both obligations were debts he was
entitled to discharge from community property. (See Civ.
Code, § 172; Grolem'und v. Caffe-rata (1941) 17, Ca1.2d679,
688 [111 P.2d 641].)
[1] The policy of protecting the husband's creditors outweighs the policy of protecting family income even from pre':
marital creditors of the husband. Community property is
therefore available to such creditors. (Grolemund v. Cafferata,
supra, 17 Ca1.2d 679, 689; Nichols v. Mitchell (1948) 32 Cal. .
:!d 598, 610 [197 P.2d 550]; Odone v. Marzocchi (1949.) 34
Ca1.2d 431, 440 [211 P.2d 297, 212 P.2d 233, 17 A.L.R.2d
]]09].) As such a creditor, a husband's first wife can levy
against the community property of his second marriage· for·
alimony payments due. (Bruton v. Tearle (1936) 7 Ca1.2d 48,
57 [59 P.2d 953, 106 A.L.R. 580] ; Yager v. Yager (1936) 'J
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Ca1.2d 213, 220 [60 P.2d 422, 106 A.L.R. 664].) [2] As
manager of the community property , , with like absolute
power of disposition, other than testamentary, as he has of his
separate estate" (Civ. Code, § 172), the husband may also
voluntarily discharge such obligations from community property. In California, there are ordinarily no separate as distinguished from community debts of the husband. [3] With
exceptions not relevant here, "our community system is based
_upon the principle that all debts which are not specifically
made the obligation of the wife are grouped together as the
obligations of the husband and the community property."
(Grolem1tnd v. Caf/erata, s-upra, 17 Ca1.2d 679, 688.) [4] It
does not follow, however, that the community can never claim
reimbursement from the husband's separate estate when community property has been used to discharge a husband's obligation. The husband's legal right of management and control
has long been recognized to imply correlative duties to his
wife. His duties are analogous to those of a. partner; he cannot obtain an unfair advantage from the trust placed in him
as a result of the marital relationship. (Vai v. Bank of Amer-_ica (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 329, 337-339 [15 Cal.Rptr. 71, 364 P.2d
247]; Fields v. Michael (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 443, 447-448
[205 P.2d 402].) Thus, in Provost v. Pt'ovost (1929) 102 Cal.
App.775 [283 P. 842], the community was held to be entitled
-. to reimbursement to the extent of community funds used by
the husband for the improvement of his separate property.
"To hold otherwise would be to permit the authority of the
husband in controlling the community property, given him in
the interest of greater freedom in its use and for its transfer
for the benefit of both himself and his wife, to become a
weapon to be used by him to rob her of every vestige of
interest ill the community property with which the law has
expressly invested her. Such a conclusion would violate every
sense of justice, and outrage every principle of fair dealing
known -to the law. The provisions of our code do not require
us to so hold, nor do the prior decisions of this jurisdiction
compel or warrant a ruling which would thus_ uphold the
marital marauding of the wife's estate . . . . " (Provost v.
Provost, supra, 102 Cal.App. 775, 781; see also Estate of Turne-r (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 576, 580 [96 P.2d 363]; lVhite v.
, White (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 524, 530 [79 P.2d 759].)
-, Like considerations are present here. Defendant's alimony
_and child support obligations were incurred before 11is second
marriage. They represent a continuing obligation, however,
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based on both his community and separate incomes. (Webber
v. Webber (1948) 33 Cal.2d 153, 160 (199 P.2d 934]; Mueller
v. Mueller (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 245, 253 [301 P.2d 90J;
Civ. Code, § 139.) During the second marriage the parties'
net worth increased by approximately $2,000,000) of which
only $338,000 was community property. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust to plaintiff to allow defendant to
preserve his separate estate by using only community funds to
meet alimony and child support obligations totaling more
than $130,000 that were substantially based on his large separate income.
[6] An apportionment of defendant's alimony and child
support obligations between his separate income and the community income is both practical and fair. Defendant's total
separate and community income during the period of his second marriage should be used to determine the proportionate
a.mounts ihat his separate and community property will be
charged. Although his earnings from separate property are
sufficient to pay the whole, it would be inequitable to charge
the obligations wholly to his separate income, since the obligations are continuing and based in part on his community
earnings. In determining the proportion, however, his separate
income· must include capital increases in investments, even
though the gains are not realized, for otherwise defendant
would be free to use unrealized capital gains to deplete the
community for the benefit of his personal estate.
[6] Defendant contends that plaintiff received an income
tax benefit from alimony expense deductions, and that the
actual depletion of the community estate was therefore the net
after-tax cost of the payments, not the gross amount of the
payments. No specific computation of the actual benefit to
plaintiff or detriment to defendant appears, but the record
shows that both parties shared the benefit of the deductions
for alimony, which were taken on joint tax returns. Defendant had the option of filing a separate return or a joint return
and could choose whichever h~ felt was the. most advanta~eous. That choice did not depend on whether defendant paid
the alimony from separate or community income. Had the
payments been correctly alloc·ated against separate and community property, the tax would have been the same. Accordingly, no adjustment for the benefit either party received
from the alimony tax deduction need be made.
[7] At the time of his second marriage, defendant owned
all the stock of All Metal Fabricators, Inc. and Alpha Engi-
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neering Corporation, worth approximately $130,000. The trial
court found that during the marriage the value of the stock
increased by approximately $225,000 and that $95,000 of the
increase could be attributed to growth of 7 percent per annum
8S a fair return on investment. (Pereira v. Pereira (1909) 156
Cal. 1, 11-12 [103 P. 488, 134 Am.St.Rep. 107, 23 L.R.A. N.S.
880].) It found that the balance of $160,000 was attributable
to defendant's labor and skill, and was therefore community
property. It ordered defendant to pay plaintiff half the balance in money. (See De Burgh v. De Burgh (19.52) 39 Cal.2d
858, 874 [250 P.2d 598] ; Webster v. Webstet· (1932) 216 Cal.
485,488 [14 P.2d 522].)
Defendant contends that a 7 percent return is not currently
considered to be a fair or adequate return on risk capital
invested in a small, closely held corporation and that the
increase in net worth of his wholly owned corporation was
partially attributable to inflation and other general economic
and business factors. Since he offered no evidence of current
returns, however, the trial court correctly adopted the rate of
legal interest. (Pereira v. Pereira, supra, 156 Cal. 1, 11-12; cf.
Tassi v. Tassi (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 680, 691 [325 P.2d
872].) Since he also offered no evid~nce of the effect of inflation and other economic factors on his corporations, the trial
court properly disregarded those factors; (Cf. Logan v. Forster (1952) 144 Cal.App.2d 587, 601 [250 P.2d 730].)
. [8] Defendant raises a number of contentions concerning
the tax consequences of liquidating his interests to pay his
wife her share of the community estate. He bases some of
these contentions on an erroneous statement of the trial
court's findings. The trial court found profits and accruals in
excess of defendant's separate property investment and interest thereon to be community property attributable to defendant's efforts, although he had only withdrawn part of that
exceSs in the form of salary payments. Defendant assumes
that the trial court found that he had neglected to withdraw
"adequate" salaries from his wholly owned corporations. He
contends that adequate withdrawals would have been taxed at
a 70· percent rate, and concludes th~t plaintiff is entitled to
. only half the remaining 30 percent. The trial court was not
concerned, however, with whetheto defendant paid himself an
"adequate" salary, but only with what proportion of the
business was community property. That proportion was not
. ·8ffect~d bya tax obligation that might have been but was not
incurred.
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[9] Since both parties were awarded a divorce, the community property must be divided equally. (De Burgh v. De
Burgh, supra, 39 Cal.2d 858, 874.) Defendant contends that
the award to plaintiff of a money jUdgment for half the value
of the community interest in his wholly owned corporations
resulted in an unequal division, because liquidation of the
assets requires payment of income taxes and will leave him
with substantially less than the amount awarded to plaintiff.
Such taxes, he asserts, should be paid out of community
assets. l
[10] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a money judgment for the value of plaintiff's interest
instead of ordering a stock distribution to her. (Webster v.
Webster, supra, 216 Cal. 485, 488; Dallman v. Dallman
(1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 815, 819 [331 P.2d 245].)2 Although
there will be tax consequences if defendant satisfies the judgDlent by withdrawing funds from the corporations or selling
some of his atock, there is no indication that he must or
intends to do either to satisfy the judgment. He may choose to
borrow the money or make the payments out of other property. Of course, once the property is divided pursuant to the
trial court's order, the future tax consequences may vary on
further sale or liquidation from what they would have been
had the property been divided differently. The trial court
need not speculate on such possibilities, however, or consider
tax consequences that mayor may not arise after the division
of the community property. (Cf. Harley v. Whitmore (1966)
242 Cal.App.2d 461, 471 [51 Cal.Rptr. 468] ; Greene v. Wilson
~1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 852,856 [25 Cal.Rptr. 630] ; Mayberry
v. Whittier (1904) 144 Cal. 322, 325 [78 P. 16].)
[11] Plaintiff and defendant briefly set forth several
other contentions regarding the tax effects of the trial court's
lThe trial court refused to take taxes into account on the ground that
defendant introduced no evidence of their effect. The record indicates,
however, that defendant first received notice that the court would award
a money judgment in lieu of a division of stock when proposed findings
were prepared.
2Although the trial court might properly have given defendant the
option of either conveying some of his stock to plaintiff or paying a
money judgment, its failure to award stock to plaintiff was not an abuse
of discretion, despite her interest in retaining an investment in the
profitable businesses. The corporations were defendant's wholly owned
separate property at the time of bis remarriage; the increase in value
was the result in large part of his personal skill and efforts. It is unlikely
that the corporation could operate effectively with control split between
recently divorced spouses, nnd defendant had adequate separate property
to satisfy a money judgment.
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award. None is supported by a sufficient showing of immediate
Rnd" specific tax liability to establish any error in the trial
court's failure to consider the possible tax consequences
involved.
Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erroneously held
the increase in value of defendant's investment in five related
corporations (the "Hamilton Group") to be entirely separate property. In March 1958, defendant purchased 50 percent
of the outstanding stock in Airborne Electronics for $1,000;
by the time of his remarriage it was worth $57,212.91. During
the first 18 months of his second marriage, defendant purchased 40 percent of the issued and outstanding shares in
Hamilton Electro Sales for $4,000, 50 percent of the outstanding shares in Electro Ad Agency for $500, 25 percent of the
issued shares in Hamilton Electronics for $1,250, and 40 percent of the issued shares in Hamilton Electric Sales-North for
$1,000. In October 1961, Airborne Electronics changed its
name to Hamilton Electro Corporation and acquired all of
defendant's stock in the five corporations in exchange for
241,200 shares of Hamilton Electro stock. In October 1961,
defendant sold 27,500 shares for $187,687.50. In November
1962, the assets and stock of Hamilton Electro Corporation
were acquired by A vnet Electronics Corporation and defendant received 106,850 shares of Avnet stock. In February
1963, he sold 26,700 shares for $550,594.26. At the time of the
trial defendant owned 83,374 shares of Avnet stock with a
market value of $1,073,440.25. Cash dividends during his second marriage totaled $60,643.98.
[12] It is undisputed that defendant invested his separate
property in the Hamilton Group and rendered some services
to the five corporations involved. The trial court found, however, that" no portion of the increase in the value of the stock
of said corporations is attributable to defendant's personal
character, energy, ability, capacity or services; that defendant
expended only a minimal effort; that there is no evidence
attributing a value to defendant's services; and that the same
is the separate property of defendant. "
" An apportionment of profits is required not only when the
.husband conducts a commercial enterprise but also when he
. invests separate funds in real estate or securities. [Citations.]
The proceeds and increment in value are apportioned entirely
" to the husband's separate estate" only when they are attributable solely to the natural enhancement of the property
[citations] or when the husband expended only minimal effort
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and the wife introduced no evidence attributing a value to his
sr.rvkes. (Cozzi v. Oozzi, 81 Cal.App.2d 229, 232 [183 P.2d
,39]; Estate of Barnes, 128 Cal.App. 489, 492 [17 P.2d
1046].)" (Estate of Neilson (1962) 57 Ca1.2d 733, 740-741
[22 Cal.Rptr. 1, 371 P.2d 745].) The evidence supports the
trial court's finding that defendant's efforts were minimal
within the meaning of the foregoing rule.
The record shows that from the time of his remarriage until
he severed his connection with A vnet Electronics except as a
shareholder, defendant spent virtually all of his time and
efforts in the management of the business affairs of All Metal
Fabricators, Inc. and Alpha Engineering Corporation.
Defendant owned all the stock in these two corporations and
served as president and director of each. Defendant owned
only 50 percent of the shares of the Hamilton Group, and the
other major stockholder, Tony Hamilton, directed the business
affairs of the five corporations. Although defendant assisted in
setting up several of. the corporations and was given the title
of vice-president and director of each of the five corporations,
and although he later assumed the title of president of Hamilton Electro Corporation for one fiscal year, he attended only
a few board meetings of the latter and none of the other four
corporations, and devoted no time to their affairs or management. He received no salary except from Hamilton Electro
Corporation, for which he devoted "perhaps an hour a
week," usually during the lunch hour, to its affairs; he had
no desk, telephone, clerical help, or office facilities. The hour
was spent mainly consulting with Mr. Hamilton. He assisted
in obtaining a bank loan for Hamilton Electro Corporation,
and discussed with Mr. Hamilton whether or not to place the
banker on its board of directors, but generally he participated
only to a "limited extent" in policy decisions. He and Hamilton had the idea of reorganization and public offering, but
this work was done primarily by a law firm. The acquisition
of the Hamilton Group assets was initiated by A vnet and
carried out by negotiations between it and Tony Hamilton;
although defendant took a trip to New York in connection
with the transaction, Hamilton took care of "most 'of the
stuff" relative to the A VIlet acquisition.
[13] Even though defendant's efforts were minimal,
plaintiff was entitled to introduce other evidence that they
were nevertheless of measurable value. (Kenney v. Kewney
(1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 139 [274 P.2d 951].) Since she
did not do so, however, the trial court did Dot err in not
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allocating any of the increase in value in defendant's investment in the Hamilton Group to the community. (Estate of
Neilson, supra, 57 Cal.2d 733, 740-741.)
[14] Plaintiff next contends that the evidence does not
support the trial court's finding that assets acquired with
funds from an account with Security First National Bank
were defendant's separate property. At the time of his remarriage, defendant had $793.88 in a checking account in the
Santa Monica Bank. During the marriage he made deposits
totaling $262,507.91, either directly or through a savings
account that he subsequently opened in the same bank. Plaintiff was authorized to draw checks on the checking account,
and did so during the marriage. Both parties used the accoun t
for items such as living expenses, taxes, alimony, child support, and medical expenses. The trial court found the $113.43
balance in the Santa Monica account to be community property. At the time of his remarriage, defendant also had a
balance of $31,235.07 in a checking account in the Security
First National Bank. Plaintiff was never authorized to draw
checks against this account and never did so. During the marriage, defendant made a number of deposits in the Security
Bank account. He could not identify the sources of the deposits made between June 2, 1959, and November 16, 1961, during which time he made several investments in stocks with
funds withdrawn from the Security Bank account. Plaintiff
contends that the separate funds originally on deposit with
the Security Bank at the time of the marriage were exhausted
by October 31, 1959, and that because deposits to the account
were not identified or traced, defendant has not carried the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the deposits were
community property. (Civ. Code, § 164, Estate of Sehabiaguc
(1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 793, 798 [119 P.2d 30]; Estate of
Boody (1896) 113 Cal. 682, 687 [45 P. 858] ; Estate of Duncan (1937) 9 Cal.2d 207, 217 [70 P.2d 174].) Accordingly,
plaintiff contends that the stocks purchased with funds from
the account between June 2, 1959, and November 16, 1961, are
community assets. (Pope v. Pope (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 353,
362 [227 P.2d 867].)
The evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption and support the trial court's finding that the funds in the Security
.Bank account were defendant's separate property. Defendant's only community income, apart from interests in various
.. trust funds and increases in the value of his businesses, was
salary income, and there is no evidence of community funds

570

:
,

i

~

i

WEINBERG V. WEINBERG

[67 C.2d

received by defendant from any other source. Defendant testified that he deposited aU his salary checks in the Santa Monica Bank, either in the checking or savings account. There is
no evidence that community funds were deposited elsewhere,
nor is there evidence that disbursements for community purposes were made out of the Security Bank account rather than
the Santa Monica Bank account. An exhibit prepared by
defendant's accountant, which compares his net salaries to
deposits in the Santa Monica Bank from June 1959 to June
1963, shows that in two years deposits were greater than the
salaries and in the other two years deposits were less than the
$70,000 per year salaries by only approximately $10,000; over
the four-year period total salary income was $260,391.04 and
total deposits were $262,507.91. The trial court was justifi~d
in finding that defendant segregated his community income in
the Santa Monica Bank account and kept it apart from his
separate iI1come, which he deposited in a different bank, and
that any increase in defendant's Security Bank account,
although not entirely accounted for, was from separate property. (Civ. Code, § 163.)
[15a] Defendant next contests the trial court's award of
$4,400 to plaintiff as separate property. Plaintiff received a
$4,400 check in settlement of a cause of action for personal
injuries, which she indorsed and delivered to defendant. He
deposited it in his Santa Monica Bank savings account, which
was a community account, and thereafter the money was
transferred to the Santa Monica joint checking account used
by both panies to pay commumty expenses. Under these circumstances plaintiff must be presumed to have made a gift of
the $4,400 to the community, for" a wife who uses her separate funds in payment of family expenses without agreement
regarding repayment cannot require her husband to reimburse
her. [Citations.] . .. [16] The basic rule is that the party
who uses his separate property for community purposes is
entitled to reimbursement from the community or separate
property of the other only if there is an agreement between
the parties to that effect." (See v. See (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 778,
785 [51 Cal.Rptr. 888,415 P.2d 776].)
[15b] Plaintiff contends that the separate fund was entrusted to defendant as a fiduciary and that since she did not
transfer the money from the savings account to the checking
account, she did not knowingly use her separate funds in payment of family expenses. She therefore concludes that no presumption of a gift arose. rfhere is no support in the record for
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plaintiff's contention that she turned the money over to defendant merely for safekeeping. Plaintiff testified that" I haven't
the foggiest notion how much [the settlement] was. Frank took
the money. I asked him what it was, and everything, and he
said, 'Why do you need it Y' He said I am a rich woman, so he
put it in his own account." Plaintiff knew the source of the
money, and consented voluntarily to its disposition by
defendant on the ground that she did not need it. She cannot
now complain because the money was used by both defendant
and herself to pay community expenses. She imposed no
restrictions on how the money was to be used, and there was
no agreement regarding reimbursement. Accordingly, the trial
court erred in finding that the fund remained separate property. (See v. See, supra, 64 Cal.2d 778,785.)
[17] Defendant finally attacks the trial court's order to
pay plaintiff's $20,000 legal fees out of his separate property.
(CiV'. Code, § 137.3.) Defendant contends that plaintiff's
attorney's fees should have been charged against the comm~nity property before it was distributed. He relies on the
statement in Wilson v. Wilson (1948) 33 Cal.2d 107, 113 [199
P.2d 671], that the theory behind such an award is to compensate the wife for the husband's use of the community
estate to pay his attorney. Section 137.3 of the Civil Code is
not so limited, for it gives the coprt discretion to order payment of "such amount as may be reasonably necessary ... for
attorney's fees' , without regard to the available sources.
Even when the wife has separate property in addition to community property, the trial court need not require her to resort
to her own capital for payment of her counsel before ordering
her husband to pay attorney's fees. (Orevolin v. Orevolin
(1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 565, 572-573 [31 Cal.Rptr. 622] ; Sigesmund v. Sigesmund (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 628. 632 [252
P.2d 713] ; Primm v. Primm (1956) 46 Ca1.2d 690, 696 [299
P.2d 231].) Here plaintiff had no separate property. No abuse
of discretion appears.
Since the trial court erred in allocating the child support
and alimony payments between separate and community
property and in awarding plaintiff the $4,400 representing
her personal injury damages, the judgment must be reversed
insofar as it adjudicates the property rights of the parties.
Since the award of alimony may have been based in part on
the division of property, it must also be reversed. The parts of
t~e judgment determining the property rights of the parties
and awarding alimony are reversed. The other parts of the

judgment are affirmed. The trial court is direeted to amend its
findings of fact and conclusions of law in accord with the
views expressed herein, to redetermine the amount of alimony,
and to enter the appropriate judgment. Plaintiff shall recover
costs on these appeals.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.
The petition of defendant and appellant for a rehearing was
denied November 29, 1967.
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